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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SUE LACY OLSEN
Plaintiff - Respondent
vs.

No. 17040

REED J. OLSEN
Defendant - Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff seeking a divorce from
the Defendant.

The District Court of Cache County granted

Plaintiff a divorce and entered its judgment and decree of
divorce which divided the property acquired by the parties
during their marriage.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks to sustain the Judgment and order of
the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married. at Elko,
Nevada on April 14, 1976.
No children have been born as a result of this marriage.
Each of the parties are middle-age individuals, having acquired
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

property prior to their marriage from other sources.

During

their marriage, the parties each contributed, in varying degrees
income towards the support of the family unit.
The Plaintiff filed this action for divorce on September 1,
1978 and a chronology of the divorce proceeding is as

follows~

a.

September 1, 1978, Plaintiff files divorce.

b.

Defendant served with Summons, September 1, 1978.

c.

Court issues Order to Show Cause, September 1, 1978.

d.

September 10, 1978, attempted reconciliation between

the parties.
e.

February 22, 1979, Plaintiff filed a Motion and

Affidavit for Order to Show Cause and Restraining Order.
f.

March 19, 1979, District Court enters temporary

restraining order.
g.

April 1, 1979, attempted second reconciliation.

h.

August 21, 1979, second reconciliation fails.

i.

October 2, 1979, Plaintiff forwards Interrogatories to

Defendant.

j.

October 17, 1979, Plaintiff forwards Notice of

Readiness for Trial to the Defendant.
k.

November

, 1979, Plaintiff filed an affidavit and

Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories, set case for trial
and award attorney's fees.

Court issues Order to Show Cause to

Defendant's attorney.
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1.

December 6, 1979, Defendant files answers to

interrogatories.
m.

December, 1979, Plaintiff makes second request for

trial setting.
n.

December 19, 1979, Court sets trial for March 7, 1980

as a Second setting, August 26, 1980 as a First setting.
o.

February 21, 1980, Plaintiff answers Defendants

interrogatories.
p.

February 29, 1980, the Court advises Defendant, case

will be tried on March 7, 1980.
q.

March 5, 1980, Defendant moves for a continuance

hearing March 5, 1980.

Case continued until March 13, 1980.

R. Trial March 13, 1980.
Plaintiff proceeded at the time of trial for hearing in
this matter without the Defendant filing an answer.

The Court

heard evidence from Plaintiff relating to grounds and evidence
from both parties relating to the division of the property.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce
were submitted to the Court and the Court on the 26th day of
March, 1980, after amending the decree, entered the Decree of
Divorce.
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT IS IN ERROR IN STATING THAT DEFENDANT HAS A
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RIGHT TO HAVE A FULL AND COMPLETE HEARING INCLUDING A CONTEST AS
TO THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE, EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO
FILE AN ANSWER OR COUNTERCLAIM IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER.
The transcript of proceedings commencing at page 46 shows
at line 11 an objection by Plaintiff's counsel as to questions
concerning grounds for divorce.

The Court indicates at line 13

that there is no answer filed in the case and in response
thereto the counsel for the Defendant indicates that the filing
of an answer has been waived and the following colloquy between
Court and counsel occurred.

(See T47)

The Court: You really haven't filed an answer and set
up that he denies that she has been treated cruel. So
what difference-does it make. Mr. Malouf: Well, I think
he should be able to state his version of the allegations
since she has made them. The Court: Well, had you filed
an answer, denying the allegation saying that there is no
grounds for divorce, then I would agree with you. Mr.
Malouf: That's true. No answer has been filed.
No answer
has been demanded either. We say that Plaintiff has waived
the right to insist on an answer being filed.
The Court:
Well the court hasn't waived the right and I see no reason
to go into it.
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
there shall be a complaint and an answer.
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross claim or third party claim shall
contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
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the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for
relief to which he deems himself entitled.
Rule 80 states as follows:

"Averments in a pleading to

which a responsive pleading is required other than those as to
the amount of damage are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading."

"Averments in a pleading to which no responsive

pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or
avoided."

An allegation in this matter claiming mental cruelty

as found in paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint would appear to
be the type of an allegation requiring an answer.

Moore's

Federal Practice, Volumne 2A page 1531 relating to Rule 7A states as follows:
"Rule 7A is patterned on but not identical with
former Equity Rule 31. That rule did away with
the necessity of a reply or of further pleadings
after the answer was filed except that a reply
was required to a set-off or counter claim.
Rule 7A contemplates that in the normal situation
of a claim and a defense, the pleading shall consist
only of a complaint and an answer".
Moore's Federal Practice, Volumne 2A Rule 8D (page 1875)
states with respect to interpretation of Rule 8D as follows:
"The pleadings which are required or permitted to
be made are listed in Rule 7A, which has been discussed in Chaoter 7 Supra.
It was there pointed
out that an earlier jointer of issue was desirable
and had been provided for by Rule; that in many
cases pleadings would stop with the answer.
Subdivision D of this rule is to compliment Rule 7A.

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

For example, all averments of the complaint other
than those as to the amount of damage, will stand
unless the Defendant answers and even if the
Defendant answers, averments not denied by him
will stand admitted.
If, in his answer, the
Defendant pleads in affirmative defense such as
the statute of limitations, the affirmative defense will be taken as denied or avoided by the
Defendant without a reply since under Rule 7A
no reply is permitted to an affirmative defense."
Divorce actions are probably the most commonly filed action
in the District Courts of the State of Utah.

It is the

Defendant's position that by reason of the fact that a divorce
is an equitable proceeding, no answer is required from the
Defendant.
position

The authorities cited above hold contrary to the
taken by the Defendant.

To hold otherwise would not

only jeopardize the status of every default divorce rendered in
the State of Utah, but also question the validity of remarriages and the issue thereof.
The position taken by the Defendant is not only untenable
but unreasonable.
Plaintiff's alternative prior to the trial of this matter,
obviously, was to file a default and take a default judgment
against the Defendant. Such a proceeding has its merits and also
has its faults.

The Plaintiff's dilemma was to attempt to get

the matter before the court and resolved because the Defendant
-6-
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had control of the assets of the parties and the Plaintiff was
financially unable to meet her obligations, such as the car
payments, and other household necessities.
trial or stipulation was imperative.

A resolution by

Obtaining a default

judgment, although expedient, has the problems of fostering
motions to set aside the default, and delays in filing briefs
and subsequent interlocutory appeals.

The Plaintiff elected to

proceed with the matter as expeditiously as possible incurring
along the way, only those attorney's fees which are reasonably
necessary for the prosecution of the case and the determination
of the case upon its merits.
The Defendant cites the case of Barber vs. Calder, 522 P2d,
700, Utah 1974 as authority for the proposition that courts
should exercise discretion liberally in favor of giving the parties an opportunity for a hearing.
The facts of the Barber case are completely different from
the facts of this case.

The holding in that case should not be

used as authority for the proposition in this case.

The cita-

tion of the case by the Defendant adds nothing to this case by
reason of the fact that the fact situation does not deal with
answers to complaints but deals with the striking of an answer
for failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure and
-7-
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affirms the trial court's decision in doing so denying the
Defendant any right for a hearing.
Notwithstanding the fact the Defendant failed to file an
answer in the above entitled matter the Defendant was still
afforded an opportunity to fully and completely investigate this
case, discover any facts pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, hire experts, and do any other act in furtherance of
this case.

The Defendant was afforded a complete hearing as

evidenced by the transcript with the exception of grounds for
divorce which consisted of a short plain statement by the
Plaintiff as to why she desired a divorce.
5 line 18 -

See Transcript Page

25, Page 6 line 1 - 3, none of which was objected to

by the Defendant.
The Defendant could have filed an answer and litigated the
grounds at any time before trial as he was never foreclosed from
doing so by the Plaintiff.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ACCEPTING THE PLAINTIFF'S
UNSUPPORTED EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE ACQUIRED BY THE
PARTIES DURING THEIR MARRIAGE AT $100,000.00.
The Plaintiff and the Defendant acquired, during their
-8-
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marriage, a house situated at 1155 East 50 south, Logan, Utah,
which home was in a home show prior to the purchase by the
parties.

The Defendant made a contribution of $8,000.00 toward

the purchase price of the house.

(TR 9,10)

Plaintiff testified that in her opinion the present estimate of the value of the residence would be $100,000.00
page 14, 15.)

(TR

The Plaintiff then went on to justify her opinion

by virtue of the valuation of the lot, the natural appreciation
of homes, and improvements made to the real estate.

The

Plaintiff was asked the following question:
"Now then, do you have a present estimate of the
value of this residence?" She stated:
" I would
say $100,000.00."
The case of State Road Commission vs. Johnson, 550 P2d,

260, where the landowner was asked for his valuation of the property and upon indicating its value, indicated that the property
was his life's work and that his valuation was based upon what
it was worth to him.

This case must be distinguished from the

present case in which the Plaintiff gave very definitive reasons
for her valuation of the property as a market value rather than
a value to her as a sentimental item.

The Defendant, at page 96

of the transcript, was asked by his attorney what he thought the
value of the house to be, and the Defendant indicated that it

-9-
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was $85,000.00.

The Defendant then, at page 97 of the

transcript, indicated that he thought both parties should get
out of the house what they had put into the house and then
divide the equity in proportion to their contribution.

However,

on page 109 of the transcript Defendant admits Plaintiff is
owner of one-hald of the house.

Essentially the Defendant gave

testimony concerning his valuation of the property, yet now in
Point II complains that the trial court erred in accepting the
Plaintiff's unsupported estimate of the value of the house.

The

Defendant gave no other credible testimony which the court could
have supported his opinion as to value, and in reading the comparison of Defendant's testimony to the Plaintiff's testimony,
it is obvious that the Plaintiff's testimony is more credible by
reason of the facts and details given by the Plaintiff.

The

Defendant cites the case of Anderson vs. State Farm Fire
Insurance for the proposition that testimony of an owner as to
value is not conclusive even if it is not contradicted.
Defendant quotes from the case but fails to include the next
paragraph which states as follows:
"His testimony is to be given such weight and credibility
as the trier of fact finds reasonable ~nder the circumstances.
Then he further cites the case of Iverson vs. Iverson, 526
-10-
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P2d 1127 for the proposition that notwithstanding equitable
powers vested in the District Court, the Court cannot act
arbitrarily or on supposition or conjecture as to fact.
Plaintiff cannot argue with either case.
The District Court took into consideration the various factors listed by the Plaintiff for the appreciation and value of
the house and valued it at $100,000.00.

The Trial Court

returned to the Plaintiff her investment of $8,000.00 together
with the sum of $7,000.00 as Plaintiff's share of the equity in
the house.

Such an award is a common daily practice of the

Courts in divorce cases and certainly does not show an arbitrary
act nor one made by supposition or conjecture as to the facts.
The Defendant cites the case of Watson vs. Watson, 561 P2d
1072 Utah 1977, in which the trial court erred in failing to
take post judgment evidence as a result of a motion for a new
trial by reason of the fact that Plaintiff claimed she was not
entitled to properly make discovery as to the value of the
indian jewelry because it was taken by the Defendant along with
other personal papers.
The Defendant in this case has always had the right to
obtain for himself a valuation of the residence of the parties,
and if there is fault in failing to obtain such an appraisal of
-11-
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the residence, it must lie in this case with the Defendant.
The cases cited by the Defendant do not meet the proposition the Defendant advances, other cases have, however,
addressed this question.

See Lahr vs. Lahr 478 P2d 551, New

Mexico 1970,
where the Court held as follows:
1.

In determining whether Findings of Fact are
supported by substantial evidence, we resolve all
disputed facts and indulge in all reasonable inferences
in favor of a successful party and disregard inferences
to the contrary.

2.

We presume the correctness of the judgment of the
trial court who had the advantage of evaluating the
demeanor of the parties and of the witnesses.

3.

Plaintiff acknowledges that and owner of property may
always testify as to its value •.•.. This testimony alone
constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial
courts valuation at that figure.

The valuation on its face is reasonable taking into consideration the past two years of inflation and appreciation in
the cost of building materials and labor.
The Defendant also gave his valuation, however, the trial
court elected to treat the Plaintiff as more credible and chose
her testimony.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOCATING THE PERSONAL
PERTY OF THE PARTIES AND THE DEBTS OF THE PARTIES.
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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PR~

As stated by the New Mexico Court in the case of Lahr vs.
Lahr, Supra, a decision of a trial court is not to be upset
unless the decision was manifestly unjust, inequitable and an
abuse of discretion warranting the Supreme Court to substitute
its judgment therefore.

The Defendant cites the case of Reed

vs. Reed, Utah 594 P2d, 871, where the trial court awarded the
wife - Plaintiff 90% of the assets of the parties.

This was a

marriage of long duration and the Supreme Court remanded the
case back to the trial court stating, "if it appears that the
decree is so discordant with an equitable allocation, that it
will more likely lead to further difficulties and distress than
to serve the desired objective, then a re-appraisal of the
decree must be undertaken."

Plaintiff does not disagree with

the fact situation or the holding of the court.

See also Cline

vs. Cline, Utah 511, P2d, 1284, as cited by the Defendant.
Each of those cases are pertinent only to their fact situation.
The facts of this case are different.
Exhibits 8 and 9 entered into evidence in the above entitled
matter by the Plaintiff, is a list of the property acquired by the
parties during their 2 year marriage and an allocation of that
property.

Each of the parties have had an opportunity to value

the various assets and their valuation was attached thereto.

-13-
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The

trial court, in making a division of the property, used such
valuation in making an equitable division of the property of the
parties.
With respect to the debts and obligations of the parties,
the Defendant claims a contribution to the marriage of
$60,523.88 to be substracted from this contribution is a contribution of $28,118.26 for the house, leaving an approximate
balance of $32,000.00 as the Defendant's alleged contribution
during the course of their marriage in contrast to the $7,000.00
contribution by the Plaintiff.
The evidence reflects that the Plaintiff's only liquid
assets at the time of the trial was $32.00 in her checking
account.

(See TR. page 121, line 25)

She was employed at the

time of the trial by General Implement Distributors in Salt Lake
City, Utah (TR page 4) at a salary of approximately $600.00 per
month.

(TR page 115, line 5).

Plaintiff did not have her own transportation to come to
trial, and, therefore, came from Salt Lake to Logan in a
borrowed car

(TR page 8, line 9 - 12).

Plaintiff gave up her

only transportation to the Defendant by reason of the fact that
it was to be repossessed by the bank inasmuch as Plaintiff
couldn't maintain the payments.

(TR page 18, line 22, 23)

-14-
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From

the foregoing, the Court could reasonably find that the
Plaintiff did not have the ability to pay any debts and obligations or attorney's fees for her own representation.
On the other hand, the outstanding debts and obligations as
claimed by the Defendant are not, in fact,
tions incurred by the parties.

the debts and obliga-

Although it is conceded that

there is evidence that some of the debts and obligations may
have been incurred by the parties, however, those debts were, by
in large, for the purchase of property in the Defendant's
possession or debts or charge cards used by the Defendant after
the separation.
The debt through Forseys in the amount of $375.00 was for
furniture the Defendant had in his living room (TR page 72).
The debt to Federal Employees Credit Union was for a motorcycle
in the Defendant's possession and it is curious to note that in
the year since their separation, the debt has not been substantially reduced by the Defendant.

(TR 73, TR 74, TR 75, TR 109)

Claiming the first mortgage loan payment on the house,
since separation as a debt yet, the Defendant admits that he is
living in the house and seeks to charge it as a joint debt or
expense.

However, the Defendant aoes concede at page 109 of the

transcript that the Defendant lived in the house and complained
-15-
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he is paying the mortgage balance on a home she is "one-half the
owner of."
Apparently, the Court felt the Defendant's concession was
of some importance.
With regards to the Visa account, the Defendant sought to
have the Plaintiff pay half of the indebtedness claiming he had
very accurate records at page 102 of the transcript.

However,

he could not detail to the Court, the balance of Visa, current
charges since his separation, nor the amount of the account at
the time of the separation.

He did, however, concede that the

Plaintiff paid $200.00 on the account stating at page 103 of the
transcript, "I think $200.00, but I may be wrong."
With respect to Master Charge, Defendant indicates he has
paid $1,562.00 (Tr. 77) and that there remains a balance on the
Master Charge of $1,524.00.

No attempt is made on the part of

the Defendant to determine the indebtedness on Master Charge by
the parties during their marriage, the items purchased with the
Master Charge for which he may or may not have received or which
Plaintiff may or may not have received, but does concede at page
103 of the transcript that the Plaintiff paid $450.00 in May of
1979.

-16-
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At page 103 of the transcript the Defendant was asked
"Now that you indicate what you want to do, the only
fair thing to do is divide the Master Charge and the Visa
equally as of February, 1980,
is that correct: Answer:
Yes. And how much have you paid on the Master Charge or
how much have you charged to the Master Charge since your
separation. Answer:
I have no idea".
The ZCMI debt, Defendant wishes to divide of $153.42 is for
furniture in his possession.

(TR 79 - TR 85)

A review of the record in an effort to determine from the
Defendant's testimony the debts incurred by the parties and the
property which relates to the debt, leaves the reader with the
inescapable conclusion that from the evidence introduced by the
Defendant, it is impossible to determine the outstanding debts
and obligations attributable to the parties and the property
which was purchased by that debt and obligation in the
Plaintiff's possession.
It appears that the trial court, taking into consideration
the evidence introduced by the Defendant, allocated the property
to the parties and the debts and obligations of the parties
fairly and equitably.

Had the Defendant clearly defined debts

related to property in the Plaintiff's possession such as the
automobile taken by the Plaintiff subject to the indebtedness
thereon, it may have been possible for the court to allocate
-17-
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debts to the Plaintiff which she had in her possession.
However, the record leaves much to be desired by way of definition as it relates to the Defendant's claimed error of distributing property to the Plaintiff and the bills to the Defendant.
The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and property
interests and the party appealing therefrom has the burden of
proving that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial err or that the
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or that such
a serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.

Pope vs. Pope, Utah 589 P2d, 752; English vs.

English, Utah 565 P2d , 409; Hansen vs. Hansen, Utah 537 P2d
491; Mitchell vs. Mitchell, Utah 527, P2d, 1359.

The evidence

in this case should be reviewed most favorable to the findings
of the trial court.

Stucki vs. Stucki, Utah 562, P2d, 240.

Literally, hundreds of other cases could be cited for the
propositions stated above.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant's principal contention as evidenced by his
brief, is that the Court did not choose to believe his client as
it relates to the value of the house, allocation of debts, and
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the division of property.

The record reflects the Defendant's

inconsistancies and inaccuracies.
The Defendant would like to have the Court consider the
number of marriages of the Plaintiff and the fact that the
Plaintiff, may in the future,

inherit some property from her

mother, none of which is pertinent to this case.

On the other

hand, the Plaintiff's testimony contains a statement as to the
value of the house based upon a market value and the grounds for
the making of the estimate of value.

Plaintiff's evidence con-

tains an allocation of the property of the parties,

(See

Exhibits 8 and 9) which has a definiteness attached to it and
in which the court could make a reasonable division of the
property.

Plaintiff essentially introduced no evidence as to

indebtedness by reason of the fact that the Defendant, had at
the time of the separation of the parties, removed into his
possession the books and records of the parties making it
impossible for the Plaintiff to introduce any evidence as to
indebtedness. The record, as introduced by the Defendant leaves
much to be desired in the way of accuracy, certainty, and
clarity.
The Defendant complains that he was not allowed to introduce evidence as to grounds for divorce, yet the pleadings do
-19-
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not even reflect an answer filed by the Defendant.

(TR 46, 47)

The record further illustrates the Plaintiff's reason for not
objecting to the absence of an answer filed and why a default
was not filed.

(TR page 99, lines 13 -

25)

The Plaintiff's financial position at the time of trial was
evidenced by the fact that she had lost her automobile because
she could not pay the monthly payments and that she had a nominal sum of $32.00 in her checking account on December 5th.
The tenor of the trial was established by the Defendant on
re-cross examination of the Plaintiff when he asked as follows:
Question:
Isn't it true that you have your mother
as a source of income. Answer: That's not true.
The Plaintiff, at the time of the trial, had been denied
payment of a $150.00 a month temporary support and, was unable
to maintain current her debts and obligations particularly her
automobile.

She had no money to pay her attorney, she had

inves~

her funds in the residence in which the Defendant was living.

It

was important to the Plaintiff that the Trial Court render a
decision in the matter.

This appeal has had the same effect upon

Plaintiff's financial status, she has no return of her money, no
attorney's fees to perfect the appeal, she has lost the car for
a second time.

The Plaintiff's only request is a resolution
-20-
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of this case with attorney's fees and costs to be paid.
The trial court correctly allocated the property and the
debts between the parties taking into consideration the evidence
introduced by the parties.

DATED

th~

day of

ge W. Preston
orney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Brief to the Defendant's attorney, Raymond N.
Malouf, MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS,
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Utah 84321, on this;?j'
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